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EFFECTS OF POST-WWII U.S.GOVERNMENTAL
FISCAL POLICIES
JOEL A. DEVINE
Department of Sociology
Tulane University
ABSTRACT
Time series analysis of the relative
class income distributional consequences of
postwar U.S. fiscal practices reveals that
governmental revenue policies have had a pro-
capital bias while state expenditures have
tended to favor labor. The net impact of these
processes has served to leave the market-
generated income distribution largely intact,
despite the historically unprecedented growth
of the public sector during this period.
Finally, in light of these findings, the
distributive impact of the current admini-
stration's fiscal program are considered.
Less than three months into his pres-
idency, Ronald Reagan submitted to Congress
the administration's proposed fiscal year 1982
budget (1), a document reflecting in a number
of particulars the conservatism of the Pres-
ident, his cabinet officers, Congress, and,
apparently, a large segment of the elec-
torate. At the heart of this budget were
unprecedented peacetime increases in defense
outlays and equally significant, perhaps hist-
oric, reductions in a broad range of social
service outlays.
Admirers of the administration argued
that the slashing of federal entitlements
together with the personal and business tax
cuts enacted in the 1981 Economic Recovery Act
were necessary to control the growth of the
federal government and to increase private
economic initiative. In short, these measures
were a welcome first step along a political
path culminating ultimately--at least in the
eyes of administrative spokespersons--in a
return to "fiscal responsibility". Together
with the relaxation of current and proposed
federal regulation and a tight monetary pol-
icy, this fiscal package was designed to
enhance individual incentive and to induce
substantial economic growth (Executive Office
of the President, 1982a: 3-10).
Critics of budget director David Stock-
man's "budget ax" and the underlying supply-
side prophesies of George Gilder and Arthur
Laffer, of course, portray a rather different
scenario: that the Reagan administration does
not simply wish to reduce federal spending and
regulation, but also desires to redistribute
wealth and income from the lower and working
classes to the (already) enriched segments of
American society and to the corporate sector
by dismantling the vestiges of Johnson's
"Great Society" and by reducing the tax burden
on the wealth. (2) In sum, the administration
is not simply reducing the growth in federal
spending and taxation and hoping to enhance
private accumulation but is attempting to
engage in an unprecedented regressive redis-
tribution of income.
In an effort to adjudicate between these
positions and shed further light on some of
the economic consequences of the Reagan admin-
istration's New Economic Program (NEP), it is
useful to place these policies in historical
perspective. Hence, the present research pro-
vides an empirical analysis of the class
income distributional effects of governmental
spending during the post-Second World War era
(3). Through application of a time-series
regression analysis (4), the following
questions are empirically assessed:
(a) Have governmental expenditure and
revenue policies (i.e., fiscal policy) altered
the relative shares of national income re-
ceived by labor and capital?
(b) If so, who benefits--capital or
labor-- and through what budgetary mechanisms
are these advantages conferred?
Empirical exploration of these questions
not only adds to our understanding of the
mechanisms by which material resources are
distributed in the U.S., but also establishes
baselines to appraise the distributive impacts
of the Reagan administration's fiscal poli-
cies. Before undertaking these analyses,
however, it is instructive to obtain an over-
view of governmental spending patterns and
trends in the post-war era.
Post-WWII Trends in Governmental Expenditures
It is an incontrovertible fact that
governmental spending has undergone an un-
precedented expansion since the end of the
Second World War -- regardless of which
governmental level or metric of presentation
we choose to examine. In Table 1, this growth
is chronicled at the aggregate, federal, and
state and local levels of government. Data
for spending by each of these governmental
units are presented in nominal (current), real
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(constant), real per capita dollars, as a
percent of the gross national product (GNP),
percent of total governmental spending, and in
terms of mean annual changes for the years
1946-1980.
During this period total governmental
expenditures have undergone more than a four-
fold increase in constant dollar terms and
have risen from approximately a fifth of the
gross national product to a third (5). In
nominal terms this growth is even more vivid.
lhile state and local governmental expend-
itures still trail behind federal spending,
the ration between them had dropped from
approximately 1:2 to 2:3, indicating that an
increasing proportion of total governmental
spending is undertaken at the sub-national
level. Similarly, since the mid-1950's, state
and local governmental spending growth has
tended to escalate more sharply than federal
expenditures. In addition, Table 1 reveals
that the federal government has been required
to resort to deficit financing at an increas-
ing level. Whereas the average annual federal
budget was in surplus during the late 1940's,
since that time there has been a tendency
towards ever larger budget deficits so that by
the late 1970's the mean annual deficit was in
excess of $49 billion.
Additional light is cast on these expend-
iture trends in Table 2 where sub-national
governmental spending in the post-war U.S. is
decomposed into its state and local com-
ponents, the federal budget is divided into
its civilian and defense categories, and
annual budgetary figures for each of the
governmental units and the federal defense-
civilian functions are shown for five year
intervals for the years 1949 to 1974 and
annually for the 1974-1980 period. As dis-
closed in Table 2, local governmental spending
has run consistently higher than state
spending throughout the post-WW II era. While
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both forms of sub-national spending generally
have escalated more sharply than federal
expenditures, their patterns of growth have
been fairly similar (also see Table 1).
The major spending transformation evi-
denced in Table 2 concerns the altered com-
position of federal expenditures during the
post-Second World War years. Whereas, defense
spending outstripped civilian expenditures
until the end of the Vietnam War, this pattern
reversed in the early 1970's, so that by 1974
civilian forms of spending were running about
fifty percent ahead of, and escalating at a
far more dramatic rate, than the parallel
defense figures. In terms of the percent of
the gross nation product (GNP) devoted to the
federal warfare and welfare functions, the
following may be observed: In 1949, the de-
fense effort absorbed 8.5% of GNP and civilian
spending represented 6.7% of the nation's
output. By the end of the Korean War (1954),
these figures stood at 12.8% and 5.5% respec-
tively. Thereafter, the defense budget tended
to hover at approximately at 10% of GNP until
the end of the Vietnam conflict when it began
to decline (as a percent of GNP and in real
dollar terms). This decline continued until
the 1980 fiscal year when President Carter
sought to arrest this trend and bolster U.S.
and NATO defenses. However, during this same
period, civilian spending at the federal level
continued to increase from the noted low of
5.5% of GNP in 1954 to a high mark of 12.6% of
GNP in 1980. In current dollar figures, civil-
ian federal spending climbed from $17.2
billion to $331 billion during this thirty-two
year period. After controlling for inflation
and population growth, this still represents
more than a 350% increase. Clearly, the
recent pressures for increased expenditures
have been felt primarily on the civilian side
of the federal ledger.
Finally, the data presented in Table 2
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further sugest that .any of the policies of
the current ac.;inistration, namely, the esca-
lation in defense spen"inj, an increased re-
liance on sub-nationai governmental expend-
itures, and a reduction in the growth of
civilian spending, albeit in less drastic
terms, nad already been initiated during the
Carter administration. Now, let us turn to an
examination of the class distributional con-
sequences of these fiscal patterns.
Class Income Consequences of __Governmen-t
Fiscal Policies
Very few researchers have sought to
analyze the impact of governmental fiscal
policies on the overall distribution of income
in the United States. Furthermore, the few
studies which have been undertaken have not
examined the class consequences of govern-
mental expenditure and revenue policies.
Nonetheless, the limited research available is
highly pertinent to the present inquiry.
In a longitudinal (i.e., over time)
analysis, Reynolds and Smolensky (1977:2)
conclude that the American fiscal system
serves to reduce inequality significantly.
The mechanism for this does not lie in the tax
structure, however, since the actual overall
impact of taxation in the United States is not
particularly progressive (see, Pechman and
Okner, 1974). Rather, it is due to the impact
of governmLental expenditure in general and
transfer payments in particular (see also,
Plotnick and Skidmore, 1975). Uilliamson and
Lindert (1980) also provide an analysis of the
influence of state spending on the "pre-fisc"
(6) distribution of income for the post-1929
period and arrive at the same general
conclusion.
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In sum, the relatively sparse work on the
relationship between income inequality and
state revenue and expenditure policies
suggests that fiscal policy has had a mildly
progressive redistributive effect. However,
according to Williamson and Lindert (1980),
the lion's share of income redistribution
which has taken place in the United States
occurred before 1947, and it was not due
primarily to direct governmental policies.
Since that time, the net income distribution
has been fairly stable with state fiscal
policies serving to offset market-based
tendencies toward increasing inequality.
While instructive, it must be recognized
that these studies examined an aggregate
measure of the U.S. income distribution, the
gini index, and, therefore, do not allow one
to speak to the question of how classes divide
the social product, an issue of central
concern in the present research. Moreover,
between 1949-1976 (the period investigated in
this paper -- see Footnote 3) the gini index
did not change appreciably (United States
Bureau of the Census, 1980). Hence, without
much variation, the gini coefficient provides
little opportunity by which to isolate the
distributional effects of governmental fiscal
policies.
A. Dependent Variable
An alternative measure which is both
consistent with the research objectives of
this paper and which is subject to greater
variation is the labor-capital income ratio.
This measure is the ratio of total employee
compensation to the sum of profits, dividends,
rent, and interest income. (See Appendix I
for details on all variable constructions and
data sources). During the 1949-1976 period
this measure ranges from a minimum of 3.365 in
-720.
1950 to a maximum of 4.700 in 1974. The mean
(X) for the entire twenty-eight year time
series is 3.927 with a standard deviation
(S.D.) of .360
The labor-capital income ratio indexes
the relative share of national income accruing
to labor and capital and thus is employed as
the dependent variable in the analyses
reported below. As such, this measure allows
us to assess the relative class distributional
impact of governmental fiscal policies by
allowing us to ascertain whether the public
sector systematically favors one class or the
other through its spending and taxing powers.
In order to empirically assess the class
distributional consequences of governmental
fiscal policies it is necessary to specify a
regression equation of the following general
form:
Y = a = biXi + ... + bnXn + e
Whereby, "Y" represents the value of the
dependent variable (the labor-capital income
ratio), "a" symbolizes the regression con-
stant, "biXi" constitutes the slope or
magnitude of the linear relationship between
independent variable "Xi" and the dependent
variable (7), and "e" denotes the residual, or
error of the equation estimate.
B. Independent Variables
Initially, two controls for crucial macro-
economic fluctuations are included: the rate
of inflation ("Inflation") and the rate of
aggregate unemployment ("Agg Unemp"). While
neither variable is, in actuality, totally
independent of state fiscal policy, these
variables are included primarily as controls
for major market-related influences that are
known to affect the distribution of income.
Numerous researchers (e.g., Hibbs, 1977;
Hollister and Palmer, 1972; Minarik, 1979;
Thurow, 1980) have previously documented that
inflation exerts a progressive (i.e., pro-
labor) redistributive role vis-a-vis income,
while unemployment increases levels of income
inequality.
The independent variables of central
concern are, of course, the measures that
index governmental revenue extraction and
spending policies. With respect to the
former, a single measure of total governmental
evenues ("Revenue") is employed. Inclusion of
this variable is necessary so as to assess the
net distributive impact of governmental fiscal
policies.
The full gamut of governmental spending,
that is, the array of public expenditures
across functional categories and levels of
government, are, in turn, operationalized in
accordance with the schema developed in Devine
(1983) (8). This treatment yields four
distinct but internally consistent types of
governmental outlays: 1) military personnel
spending ("Military Per"); 2) veteran's
benefits ("Veterans"); 3)infrastructural
expenditures ("Infrastructure" -- e.g., capi-
tal construction, weapons procurement, re-
search and development, communications and
transportation)' and 4) social spending items
("Social Spending" -- e.g., education,
housing, OASDI, AFDC).
Each of the fiscal variables is expressed
in "real" (i.e., deflated) per capita terms,
This specification is in line with past
research on the consequences of state spending
(e.g., Wilensky, 1975), but it reflects more
than just convention. A deflated per capital
specification serves to index a nation's
"output" of a particular good or service
independent of the size of its population and
temporal changes in the price or cost of
providing a service, and thus, affords re-
searchers the opportunity to measure the
commitment of "real" resources to the
citizenry (9).
Analysis and Discussion
An equation containing the seven above-
discussed independent variables is initially
specified. Since preliminary estimation tech-
niques revealed significant serial correl-
ation, a generalized least squares, second-
order autoregressive transformation (GLS-AR2--
see Ostrom, 1978) is used. The results from
this model are presented in column 1 to Table
3. These data indicate that neither of the
macroeconomic controls are significant (see
the reported t-statistics) and only military
personnel expenditures and social spending
significantly affect the dependent variable
(10). Both of these fiscal regressors have
positive signs, suggesting that these par-
ticular forms of public spending increase
labor's income relative to capital's share.
As for the other variables in the equation,
all are non-significant. Rather than dis-
cussing the results now, however, further
analyses will be presented before focusing
upon the substantive meaning of these
relationships.
There are, of course, a number of other
influences which could plausibly affect the
relationships presented in Column 1. Yet,
subsequent efforts (reported elsewhere, see
Devine, 1981, 1983) to control for theo-
retically salient indicators of labor organ-
ization and militancy (e.g., levels of
unionization, strike activity), the size of
the armed forces, the composition of the
American occupational structure (e.g., per-
centage white-collar, blue-collar, etc.), and
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the educational attainment of the civilian
workforce did not alter the findings presented
in Column 1 of Table 3.
However, two additional variables, one
indexing changes in the gross national product
("GNP Growth") and the other being a measure
of the legal minimum wage ("Min Wage") -- both
expressed in constant dollar terms -- are
found to exert a significant impact on the
previously reported results. A full model
that incorporates these two additional
variables as well as the previously introduced
measures of inflation, unemployment, reven-
ues, military personnel expenditures, vet-
eran's benefits, infra-structural outlays, and
social spending is presented in Column 2 of
Table 3.
Serial correlation, as indicated by the
Durbin-Watson statistic and rho, is not a
problem and the explained variance ("Adj. R.
Sq.") is quite high. More importantly, all of
the coefficients in Column 2 of Table 3 are
statistically significant.
Substantively, the findings reported in
Column 2 of Table 3 reveal that:
1) Aggregate unemployment exerts a
significant negative influence on the labor-
capital ratio. Almost tautologically, in-
creases in unemployment serve to decrease the
income of wage earners in the aggregate and
depresses the labor-capital income ratio.
2) Similarly, "real" economic growth is
found to benefit capital to a greater degree
than labor. This supports the findings of
Boddy and Crotty (1975) who note that, while
economic growth is generally beneficial across
the board, it benefits capital to a greater
extent and degree than it helps labor.
3) Alternatively, inflation is found to
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have a significant equalizing effect on the
distribution of income. Again, this partic-
ular result is entirely consistent with the
previously reported findings of numerous
economists who have demonstrated that in-
flation is far more harmful to property owners
than wage earners.
4) The coefficient for the minimum wage
variable is also positive suggesting that
labor's historical struggle to gain and
maintain a legislatively enacted wage "floor"
effect has produced a tangible favorable
outcome for wage earners.
Turning now to the measures of govern-
mental fiscal policy we find that:
5) Governmental tax policies in the
aggregate are not progressive or, perhaps,
even proportional. Rather, as evidenced by
the significant negative coefficient displayed
in Column 2 of Table 3, we see that
governmental revenue extraction is re-
gressive, i.e., it erodes labor's position
relative to capital's.
6) With respect to the four expenditure
measures, these data indicate that govern-
mental spending on social services, veteren's
benefits, and even military personnel outlays
are all progressive in impact, i.e., benefits
labor relative to capital. The coefficient
indexing infra-structural expenditures has a
negative sign in Column 2 suggesting a pro-
capital effect, but inasmuch as this negative
sign flips back to positive under alternative
specifications reported elsewhere (Devine,
1983), it should probably be considered
artifactual (11).
Saryn
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These analyses, designed to examine the
relative class income consequences of govern-
mental fiscal policies, lead to the conclusion
that for the period examined:
a) Governmental expenditures--with the
possible exception of infrastructural outlays
increase the labor-capital income ratio. That
is, governmental spending in general, and not
just on social security or relief, benefits
wage and salary earners relative to property
owners.
b) Despite the possibly progressive
structure of the federal personal income tax,
the aggregate tax extractive power of the
state sector significantly reduces the size of
the labor-capital income ratio, i.e., favors
capital relative to labor.
In short, governmental fiscal policies
are contradictory. In class terms, the rev-
enue structure is biased in favor of capital
while expenditures are pro-labor. The net
result is a complex interplay of extractive
inputs and spendings outputs whereby the
market system of allocation is modified at
both ends of the continuum, but for the most
part left intact as taxes and expenditures are
shifted backward and forward with relatively
little net change.
Conclusion
The 1980 presidential election and
subsequent efforts of the Reagan admini-
stration to arrest the expansionary trends in
state fiscal policy clearly lie outside the
direct time-frame of these analyses, but what
might the research reported here suggest with
respect to the "new economic program"? First,
efforts to root out inflation at the expense
of employment, that is, the current admini-
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stration's explicit policy preference for
manipulating the "Phillips curve" tradeoff
(see Phillips, 1958) in favor of lower
inflation and increased unemployment have a
clear pro-capital, anti-labor orientation.
Second, spending cuts in non-defense budgetary
items, especially real declines in welfare
expenditures (broadly conceived) suggest that
the living standard of the American working
population will be undermined. Inasmuch as
state expenditures appear to impact upon the
distribution of income in favor of labor and
to the relative detriment of capital, the
administration's budget cuts should reduce or,
perhaps, eradicate the relative advantage
labor has historically achieved with respect
to the distributional consequences of state
spending.
Finally, what effect should changes in
tax policy have on the factor share dis-
tribution of income? While across the board
tax cuts on personal income are universal they
are not progressive, but merely proportional.
Inasmuch as federal income taxes are the most
progressive form of taxation (see Pechman and
Okner, 1974), here again, the Reagan admini-
stration's policies should operate to the
relative advantage of capital. This pro-
capital bias will be further enhanced by
changed in depreciation allowances which
effectively negate the corporate tax (see
Thurow, 1981).
In sum, then, while these analyses do not
incorporate empirically the post-1976 American
fiscal experience, they strongly suggest that
if the patterns discovered to operate between
1949 and 1976 hold true, then the current
administration's efforts to rebuild the
American economy will fall almost exclusively
on the backs of the working population. Even
if Reaganomics is ultimately successful in
engineering return to a growing, healthy
economy, these analyses demonstrate that in so
-727-
doing it will alter the relative balance of
class forces, economically speaking, in favor
of capital
NOTES
1. See The Budget of the United States
Goenmn, Fiscal Year 1982 and the
accompanying appendix.
2. In a widely publicized set of
interviews (Greider, 1981: 46-47), David
Stockman candidly acknowledged that, "Kemp-
Roth was always a Trojan horse to bring down
the top [tax] rate" and that supply-side
theory was not at all new but simply attempted
to recast traditional conservative "trickle
down" in novel semantics.
3. Due to the unavailability of certain
post-1976 governmental data (e.g., income
figures), only the 1949-1976 period can be
assessed.
4. Readers unfamiliar with the
statistical procedures and properties of time-
series analysis should consult Ostrom (1978).
5. During the decade which preceded
World War II (1930-1939) the corresponding
figure was only 19%, whereas in the 1920-1929
decade it was 12% (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1975).
6. "Pre-fisc" refers to the pre-
governmental tax and transfer (i.e., market)
income distribution, while a "post-fisc"
distribution reflects governmental spending
and taxation. Thus, in order to assess
distributional consequences of governmental
revenue extraction and spending programs, it
is necessary to use a post-fisc measure of the
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income distribution. Otherwise, the re-
searcher would be analyzing a "pure" market
economy devoid of any direct governmental
influences.
7. The regression coefficient ("b") is
the average change in the dependent variable
associated with each unit of change in
independent variable "Xi"
8. See Devine (1983) for a discussion of
the theoretical and methodological diffi-
culties involved in the operationalization of
governmental expenditures, as well as a means
by which to resolve these dilemmas.
9. All of the fiscal variables, except
for social spending, are specified with a two-
year lag structure (t-2) to allow for adequate
diffusion of state spending and extractive
capacity. The social spending variable has a
stratified lag structure whereby non-
transferred expenditure items (e.g., educa-
tion, housing) are specified at t-2, for the
reason noted above, while its transferred
components (e.g., OASDI, unemployment
insurance) are measured with a contemporaneous
specification. The rationale for this ex-
ception is that unlike other governmental
outlays for goods of services, cash transfers
are augmentations to direct disposable income
and are not filtered through any governmental
or private sector intermediary. Furthermore,
numerous cash transfers are designed as
"automatic stabilizers" with the intent of
immediately reacting and adjusting to
fluctuations in the business cycle.
10. Heise (1975) argues that the standard
error of the regression coefficient tends to
be inflated in analyses with relatively few
cases, and, thus, a more "generous" sig-
nificance level is justified. Therefore, a
.10 level of significance is used throughout
these analyses since there are so few cases
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(N+28).
11. Multicollinearity (i.e., the condi-
tion where explanatory variables are highly
correlated) frequently plagues time-series
data of the sort analyzed here. Collinearity
increases the variance of the estimated
coefficients and thus yields less stable
estimates. The operational schema employed
here substantially reduces the collinearity
among expenditure variables (see Devine, 1983:
Table 2) as the resulting zero-order
correlations are:
Military Veterans Infra Social
Military Per --
Veterans -.138 --
Infra-
structure -.132 -.782 --
Social
Spending -.168 -.121 .589
Nonetheless, as the correlation matrix in-
dicates, the infrastructural variable con-
tinues to exhibit a high level of association
with veterans and social spending. This
suggests, then, that the noted instability is
in fact attributable to collinearity.
APPENDIX I - VARIABLES
Unless otherwise indicated, all variables
pertain to the United States, are annual
observations, and, when dollar amounts, are
measured in current dollars. Federal bud-
getary items are for fiscal rather than
calendar years. The following abbreviations
are used in this appendix: HS, The Historical
Statistics of the United States (annual); ERP,
The Economic Report of the President. 1978
(1978); NIPA, The National Income and Product
Accounts of -- h Uhnite Sttes-1-2929-A
(1977); BEA, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Survey of
Current Business" (monthly). All of the above
sources are published by the United States
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
Dependent Variabl-e
1. Labor-Capital -Income ._Ra (Employee
Compensation/Property Income), whereby
property income is the sum of cor-
porate profits with inventory val-
uation and capital consumption ad-
justments, rental income, and net
interest: ERP; HA; SA (1978).
Independent Mables
2. M ller: (defense spending less military
procurement and military research and
development costs). HS; SA (1971-
1977).
3. Veterans: HA; SA (1971-1977).
4. Infrastructure: The sum of military
procurement (SA 1957, 1963, 1968,
1972, 1977, 1978), military research
and development (HS; SA 1953 1978),
total governmental capital spending,
highway construction, other commun-
ications and transportation expend-
itures, and federal civilian research
and development funds (HS; SA 1953,
1974, 1978).
5. Soia_ Senin: The aggregation of
transfer payments (see below) at "t"
and collective consumption (see below)
at "t-2".
a. Trpryments are composed of the
following expenditure categories:
federal-benefits from social insurance
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funds (OASDI, hospital and supple-
mentary medical insurance, unemploy-
ment insurance, railroad retirement,
federal civilian employees retirement,
veterans' life insurance, workman's
compensation), military retirement,
food stamps, black lung, special
unemployment benefits, SSI, direct
relief and other: plus state and local
benefits from social insurance funds
(government pensions, cash sickness
compensation, workmen's compensation),
direct relief (AFDC, other categorical
public assistance, general assistance)
and other; NIPA; BEA (July, 1976,
1978).
b. Collective spt : Total
governmental spending on education,
health (elsewhere not included),
housing, urban renewal, and non-
federal essential services (HS; SA
1974, 1978).
6. Total Revenue (Federal minus intergovern-
mental, plus state and local): HS; SA
(1978).
7. Inflin (annual percent change in the
consumer price index): HS; SA (1977).
8. Aggregate Unemployment: ERP.
9. Gross National Product (GNP): NIPA; BEA
(July, 1977, 1978).
10. Minimum Wage: SA (1979).
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TABLE 1 - Trends in Govenmental Expenditures
Annual Means by Five-Year Periods
1946-1980
Total State and
Govern Federal Local
Level of
"Nominal"
Expenditures (a)
1946-1950 51779 34618 17161
1951-1955 93917 65969 27949
1956-1960 122943 79598 43345
1961-1965 168290 104521 63768
1966-1970 264487 157366 107121
1971-1975 421182 236479 184704
1976-1980 700693 400879 299815
Level of
"Real"
Expenditures (b)
1946-1950 95019 63839 31181
1951-1955 147679 103738 43941
1956-1960 179486 116244 63242
1961-1965 229298 142473 86824
1966-1970 312884 186404 126480
1971-1975 381124 213842 167283
1976-1980 433152 247261 185891
Per Capita
"Real"
Expenditures (c)
1946-1950 648 436 212
1951-1955 924 650 275
1956-1960 1028 666 362
1961-1965 1211 753 458
1966-1970 1558 928 629
Total State and
Govern Federal Local
1971-1975 1811 1016 795
1976-1980 1982 1131 851
Percent of
GNP
1946-1950 20.8 14.0 6.8
1951-1955 26.0 18.3 7.7
1956-1960 26.6 17.3 9.4
1961-1965 28.0 17.5 10.6
1966-1970 30.4 18.1 12.3
1971-1975 32.4 18.2 14.2
1976-1980 32.4 18.5 13.9
Percent of
Total Govern-
mental Spending
1946-1950 67.2 32.8
1951-1955 70.2 29.8
1956-1960 64.8 35.2
1961-1965 62.2 37.8
1966-1970 59.6 40.4
1971-1975 56.1 43.9
1976-1980 57.1 42.9
Federal Surplus(+)/
Deficit(-) (d)
1946-1950 + 6.359
1951-1955 - 1.184
1956-1960 - 0.005
1961-1965 - 2.123
1966-1970 - 4.878
1971-1975 -25.739
1976-1980 -49.500
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Total State andGovern Federal Loa
Percent Change in
Per Capita "Real"
Expenditures (e)
1946-1950 -10.0 -14.4 +11.5
1951-1955 + 6.2 + 8.0 + 3.9
1956-1960 + 2.9 + 2.0 + 4.6
1961-1965 + 3.8 + 2.6 + 5.7
1966-1970 + 5.1 + 4.3 + 6.3
1971-1975 + 3.3 + 3.2 + 3.6
1976-1980 + 0.5 + 1.2 - 0.4
* Intergovernmental spending included in final
destination only, i.e., state and local
(Column 3).
(a) In millions of current dollars
(b) In millions of constant (1972) dollars
(c) In constant (1972) dollars
(d) In billions of current dollars
(e) Mean annual change fro preceding half-
decade (not shown)
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Cureau
of Economic Analysis, National Income and
Product Accounts of the United States. 1929-
1974 (1977); Nationa Incom and Product
Accounts. 1976-1979. -Surv1ey-L of -iL
Business Supplement (1981); "survey of Current
Business:, vol. 57 (11) [November, 1977] and
vol. 61 (11) [November, 1981], Washington,
D.C.: G.P.O.
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